AUTHOR:Ramona Ilea

ABSTRACT:
In the last thirty years many philosophers, such as Peter Singer, Tom Regan,
Rosalind Hursthouse, and Cora Diamond, have argued in favor of a better treatment
of nonhuman animals from a variety of perspectives, including utilitarian,
rights, virtue ethics, and Wittgensteinian.1 In her recently published book, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership,2 Martha Nussbaum
argues that her theory, called “the capabilities approach,” offers a better philosophical alternative to these perspectives and provides philosophical principles that will form the basis of strong and long-lasting animal protection public policies.

My aim in this article is to assess both the philosophical merits of Martha
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach and its potential to affect public policy. I will
begin the article by giving a very brief overview of the capabilities approach, and
then explain how Nussbaum has extended it to include nonhuman animals. I will
then argue that there are currently three main philosophical problems with the
theory that need further attention. I will end by proposing a way to deal with these problems, and by showing how the capabilities approach has the potential to affect changes in public policy.